Subproject A

ORCID: 0000-0002-6523-5471

Subproject A integrates qualitative methods, philosophy, and empirical analysis to study how their impact on cooperation shapes the evolution of metaethical attitudes along the realism/antirealism divide. The subproject will begin with a theoretical review of robust (1–3) and minimal (4–6) moral realism, noncognitivism (7–12), error theory (13–15), subjectivism (10–12), and relativism (16–19), with a focus on their relevance to empirical sciences. Pölzler’s (20,21) analysis will be used as a starting point. The review will examine the construct validity of empirical studies on the sociocultural distance effect, especially those using moral disagreement to measure these attitudes (22–24). The subproject will also review the literature on the potential negative impacts of moral disagreement on cooperation to evaluate the adaptive advantages of the effect (25–29).

Subproject A will build upon two theoretical components: Stanford’s evolutionary account of norm externalization (30) and Sterelny and Fraser’s partial vindication of moral realism (31). The former is one of the most prominent accounts of the evolution of folk moral realist attitudes, and the latter is an influential evolutionary defense of moral realism. Stanford’s model posits that folk metaethical realism enhances individual fitness by protecting human cooperation from exploitation. Sterelny and Fraser argue that the evolution of morality partially vindicates moral facts as facts about cooperation. If these approaches are correct, folk metaethical realism should also be partially vindicated for promoting human cooperation.

To test this, the project will examine the working hypothesis that the sociocultural distance effect reduces the negative effect of moral disagreement on cooperation in multicultural contexts (32). The subproject will propose a cross-cultural test battery to examine the influence of sociocultural distance on cooperation in moral, political, and religious disagreements. The analysis will focus on two-person and n-person Stag Hunt games to study how realist and antirealist attitudes affect trust and perceived risk in cooperative tasks. The studies aim to confirm the cross-cultural stability of the sociocultural distance effect and its philosophical implications for folk moral realism. If consistent across cultures, this may challenge folk metaethical realism, favoring a version of metaethical pluralism. If these attitudes enhance cooperation, pluralism could be supported as an adaptation for cooperation. If this is true mostly of realist attitudes, realism may be partially vindicated against attempts to debunk it. If these attitudes do not impact cooperation, this may challenge the view that moral thought is an adaptation for cooperation. A similar pattern in other domains may suggest that these findings are part of a larger phenomenon.

Subproject A will conclude by assessing the empirical plausibility of the working hypothesis by integrating the literature review with empirical evidence from Subprojects B and C. Subproject B’s experiments will assess the impact of the sociocultural distance effect on cooperation, while Subproject C’s simulations will explore its influence on the evolution of these attitudes. After integrating the evidence, the project will refine the theoretical framework to accurately depict the interplay between metaethical attitudes and cooperation.

Return to Research.

References

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